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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is a medical malpractice action. The appeal was originally filed in the Utah
Supreme Court. That Court transferred the case to this Court by order dated June 12,
1989. This Court has jurisdiction of the case pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the jury was properly instructed on the required proof of causation

under Utah law.
2.

Whether plaintiff timely objected to the Special Verdict form, and whether

the district court abused its discretion in framing the Verdict questions.
3.

Whether the district court properly denied plaintiffs motion for a directed

verdict in favor of the defendant physicians.
4.

Whether the district court erred in awarding costs under U.R. Civ. P. 54.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW

The following determinative rules and statutory provisions are set out verbatim
in the Addendum (Add. 24-34):
U.R. Civ. P. 49, 51, 54, 59, and 61;
U.C.A. §§ 78-27-38, -39, and -40.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a medical malpractice action in which plaintiff alleges that the injuries and
death of his wife, Betty George, were caused by the negligent care of her physicians, Dr.
Kimball Lloyd and Dr. Michael Lahey, and LDS Hospital (the "Hospital"). (R. 2.) The
defendant physicians entered into a settlement with plaintiff prior to trial. (PL Opening
Statement p. 21; Trial Transcript, hereafter ffTr.fl, p. 853.) They nevertheless remained

parties and were represented at trial for the purpose of apportioning any liability of the
defendants. Following a jury trial, the jury rendered a special verdict finding that the
defendant physicians were not negligent, that the Hospital staff was negligent, but that the
Hospital's negligence was not a proximate cause of Mrs. George's injuries and death.
(R. 397, Add. 1.) Plaintiff filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. (R. 587.) The
district court subsequently entered its Final Judgment on the verdict in favor of all three
defendants. (R. 709, Add. 5.) Plaintiff thereafter filed this appeal. (R. 739.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Betty George was a 51-year-old woman with a long history of health problems,
including diabetes, hypertension, and obesity. Her physician, Dr. Brewerton, testified that
because of the seriousness of these long-standing problems and her failure to control them
properly, she was exposed to additional health risks and did not have an average life
expectancy. In the summer of 1986, Mrs. George was found to have a tumor in her
uterus and also began experiencing continuous vaginal bleeding. For these latter problems
she was referred to Dr. Kimball Lloyd, a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology. Dr.
Lloyd admitted Mrs. George to LDS Hospital on July 28, 1986 for exploratory surgery and
a hysterectomy.
complication.

Dr. Lloyd performed the surgery the next day without apparent

(Partial Transcript, hereafter "Part. Tr.,f, at 36-45; Tr. 351, 359; Trial

Exhibit, hereafter "Ex.", 1 pp. 4, 12, 56.)
On August 1, Mrs. George began showing signs of a respiratory problem. Dr.
Lloyd ordered various tests to determine the cause of the problem, but the results were
inconclusive.

Dr. Lloyd then contacted Dr. Michael Lahey, a specialist in internal
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medicine, to assist him in diagnosing the problem. After Dr. Lahey examined Mrs. George
and her test results that evening, both doctors diagnosed the problem as pulmonary
embolism, which is the presence of a blood clot in the lungs that prevents oxygenation of
the blood and results in shortness of breath (hypoxemia). Mrs. George was accordingly
administered oxygen, an anticoagulant drug, and scheduled for a pulmonary angiogram the
next day to determine conclusively the presence of a pulmonary embolus. (Tr. 368-78,
566-86; Ex. 1 p. 13.)
Mrs. George was examined the next morning, August 2, by both Dr. Lloyd and
Dr. Bearnson, a resident physician. Dr. Lloyd testified that Mrs. George's condition had
not changed significantly from the previous day, but that it was still serious. Dr. Lloyd and
Dr. Bearnson agreed that Mrs. George should be transferred from the gynecology floor
to the Intensive Care Unit ("ICU") following her pulmonary angiogram. The pulmonary
angiogram was performed later that morning, but the test revealed no sign of pulmonary
embolism. (Tr. 82-83, 379-85, 504-15; Ex. 1 p. 90.)
Dr. Lahey examined Mrs. George in the angiography suite just after completion
of the test, around 1:00 p.m., and again in the ICU. He found her condition generally the
same as the previous evening. In view of the negative test for pulmonary embolism and
recent indications of elevated temperature and blood sugars, Dr. Lahey next proposed
treatment for a possible infection. However, he concluded, in consultation with another
resident physician, Dr. Adams, that since anticoagulant drug therapy was no longer
indicated, and there was no other reason to keep Mrs. George in the ICU, she should be
transferred back to the gynecology floor.
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Mrs. George was returned there at

approximately 2:30 p.m., was assigned a special duty nurse, and was prescribed tests for
possible infection. (Tr. 85-86, 586-95, 689-702.)
Mrs. George's condition began to show signs of worsening during the later
afternoon of August 2. The special duty nurse made note of these changes, including high
fever, and summoned Dr. Adams. Dr. Adams examined Mrs. George and called Dr. Lloyd
at 4:15 p.m. regarding the fever and other changes. Dr. Lloyd ordered certain tests for
infection and an antibiotic, which was administered soon thereafter. Because he did not
issue the order "stat," requiring immediate performance, the test results were not expected
for two to three hours. Dr. Adams examined Mrs. George again at 5:00 p.m. and found
no change from the previous examination. At 6:30 p.m. Dr. Adams received some of the
requested test results and called the special duty nurse with instructions to begin
administering potassium, to control Mrs. George's heart rate, and to call Dr. Adams
immediately to report any changes in the patient's mental status. The special duty nurse
called Dr. Adams at 7:00 p.m. and reported that Mrs. George was not responsive. Dr.
Adams went directly to examine Mrs. George and, finding no heart rate, summoned the
emergency resuscitation team. The resuscitation team restarted Mrs. George's heart, but
by then she was brain dead and required mechanical ventilation. In the meantime, Dr.
Lloyd and Dr. Lahey arrived at the Hospital, examined Mrs. George, and eventually
diagnosed her condition as sepsis, an overwhelming bacterial infection.

Mrs. George

remained in a coma until August 4, when she died following a second cardiac arrest. (Tr.
390-404, 595-97, 703-16; Ex. 1 pp. 32, 169-71.)
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Plaintiff subsequently commenced this action asserting both wrongful death and
survival claims on behalf of the heirs and the estate. (R. 2.) As noted previously, the
defendant physicians settled with plaintiff out of court, but were represented as parties at
trial for purposes of apportioning liability. (PI. Open. Stat. p. 21; Tr. 853.)1
At trial, plaintiff presented the expert testimony of Harriet Gillerman, a nurse,
and Donald Owing, a respiratory therapist, regarding the standards of hospital care, the
claimed breach of those standards, and the claimed result in proximately causing Mrs.
George's injuries and death. (Tr. 169, 276.) Plaintiff presented no expert testimony from
a physician regarding the proximate cause of the injuries and death. The Hospital, on the
other hand, presented the expert testimony of three physicians, Dr. John Trowbridge, an
expert in the diagnosis of infectious processes; Dr. Lewis Weinstein, an expert in
obstetrical and gynecological infections; and Dr. Charles Elliot, an expert in respiratory
medicine, all of whom testified that Mrs. George's arrest was caused by sepsis, probably
emanating from the surgery; that the process of cascading infection was irreversible by the
time Mrs. George returned from the ICU on the afternoon of August 2; and that nothing
the Hospital staff could have done after that time would have changed her condition or
prevented her death. (Trowbridge: Tr. 530-41; Weinstein: Tr. 640-44, 656-58; Elliot: Tr.
752-64, 772-73, 780-81.) The jury obviously accorded more weight and credibility to the
Hospital's experts, finding in a Special Verdict that while the Hospital staff breached the

Plaintiff initially alleged that the Hospital was vicariously liable for the negligence of the student resident
physicians, including Doctors Bearnson, Adams and others, who were employed by the University of Utah Medical Center.
(R. 9.) However, consistent with the law, plaintiff later abandoned that theory, and the jury was properly instructed that
no failure of any of the physicians, including the student residents, could be attributed to the Hospital. (Instruction 31,
R. 529.)
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standard of care, that breach was not the proximate cause of Mrs. George's injuries and
death. (R. 397-99, Add. 1-4.) The district court accordingly entered Final Judgment in
favor of the defendants. (R. 709, Add. 5-8.) Plaintiff now appeals, challenging principally
the jury instructions related to proof of causation. (R. 739.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The primary focus of this appeal is on the district court's jury instructions
pertaining to proof of causation in a medical malpractice action. Plaintiff failed to object
to the refusal of his proposed jury instructions relating to "increased risk of injury" and
"reduced chance of survival." In any event, the proposed instructions are inconsistent with
plaintiffs belated "substantial factor" theory of the case, on which he requested no
instruction. Moreover, the requested instructions are not justified by the evidence and are
not supported by Utah law.
Challenged jury instructions 16a and 21a correctly set forth the law of Utah
regarding proof of causation. Plaintiffs objection to these instructions at trial was limited
in scope and may not be expanded on appeal. The district court expressly ruled that the
instructions were fairly included. Substantively, the instructions properly required plaintiff
to prove the cause of Mrs. George's death and claimed injuries by expert medical
testimony. In this case, that proof required testimony of a physician; the expert testimony
of a nurse or respiratory therapist was insufficient. In light of the instructions as a whole,
the district court correctly concluded that the jury was properly instructed.
Plaintiffs objection to the Special Verdict form was not raised until the motion
for new trial. In any event, the district court did not abuse its discretion in formulating
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the verdict questions. The challenged question plainly referred to causation of all the
claimed injuries and damages.
The district court properly denied plaintiffs motion for a directed verdict in favor
of the defendant physicians. Even if plaintiff has standing to assert such a motion, there
was sufficient evidence of physician negligence to preclude a directed verdict.
Finally, there is no error in the award of costs because the district court already
considered and accounted for plaintiffs objections.
ARGUMENT
Utah law is clear that a medical malpractice plaintiff must provide expert
testimony to establish (1) the standard of care; (2) the defendant's breach of that standard;
and (3) that the breach proximately caused the claimed injuries.

Hoopiiaina v.

Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1987). In this case there is no
dispute regarding the first two elements. None of the parties challenges the jury findings
that the defendant physicians were not negligent or that the Hospital was negligent.
Plaintiffs appeal is directed only to the jury finding that the Hospital's negligence did not
proximately cause Mrs. George's claimed injuries. Plaintiffs appeal is further limited in
that he does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, but rather
challenges only the jury instructions on which it is based. In minor arguments, plaintiff
also challenges the Special Verdict form, the presence of the defendant physicians as
parties, and the award of costs. As demonstrated below, these arguments have no merit
and present no grounds for a new trial under U.R. Civ. P. 59. (Add. 29-30.)2
2
The defendant Hospital here asserts a continuing objection to, and motion to strike, the addendum to plaintiffs
brief. The addendum, rather than setting forth the items required by Rule 24(f), R. Utah Ct. App., contains extensive
excerpts of trial testimony interspersed with argument and opinion of counsel. Presumably, after this Court denied
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POINT I:

THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THE REQUIRED
PROOF OF CAUSATION UNDER UTAH LAW.

It is well established that parties to a trial are entitled to have their respective
theories of the case presented to the jury in the form of instructions, but only if the theory
is supported by the evidence and the law. The refusal of a requested instruction or the
giving of a challenged instruction is reversible error only if it tends to confuse or mislead
the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises
on the law. See, e.g., Mikkeben v. Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah App. 1988); Steele
v. Breinholt, 141 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah App. 1987). Correctness of jury instructions is a
question of law. Ramon v. Fan, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989). Jury instructions must
be examined as a whole, and the giving or refusal of an instruction is not prejudicial if the
matter is adequately covered in other instructions. Goode v. Dayton Disposal, Inc., 738
P.2d 638, 640 (Utah 1987); Bigler v. Mapleton Irrigation Canal Co., 669 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah
1983). Under these standards of review, there is no reversible error in the district court's
jury instructions.
A.

PLAINTIFF FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE REFUSAL OF HIS
PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS 24 AND 32; IN ANY EVENT, THE
DISTRICT COURT ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON
PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF CAUSATION.

Plaintiff argues that the district court improperly refused his proposed jury
instructions 24 and 32, pertaining to "increased risk of injury" and "lost chance of survival,"
and that the court thereby failed to instruct the jury on his theory of causation. (Br. of
App. at 15-18.) However, plaintiff failed to raise this objection in the district court.

plaintiffs motion to file an over-sized brief, counsel simply transferred to the addendum whatever argument would not fit
within the page limitation.

8

Rule 51, U.R. Civ. P., states in relevant part:
No party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction
unless he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a
party must state distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds
for his objection. [Add. 26.]
Construing this rule in Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 358 n.7 (Utah 1975), the Court
stated:
In order for a party to take advantage of a failure to give a correct
instruction, he must have proposed such correct instruction and excepted
to the trial court's failure to give it.
The record discloses that while plaintiff proposed his instructions 24 and 32, he failed to
except to the district court's refusal to give them. Therefore, plaintiff may not raise the
claimed error in this Court. See Newsom v. Gold Cross Services, Inc., 116 U-A.R. 34, 779
P.2d 692 (Utah App. 1989) (plaintiff precluded from asserting error in denial of lost
chance of survival instruction).
In any event, plaintiffs proposed instructions 24 and 32 do not correctly set forth
the law of Utah regarding proof of causation in a medical malpractice action. Proposed
instruction 24 states that if the Hospital's acts or omissions "increased the risk [of] harm"
to Mrs. George, then on that basis alone the jury may find that the increased risk was a
proximate cause of her death and injuries. (R. 251, Add. 9.) Proposed instruction 32
states that if the Hospital's acts or omissions "destroyed a substantial possibility" for Mrs.
George's survival, then the Hospital proximately caused her death and injuries. (R. 261,
Add 10.) In support of these proposed instructions, plaintiff cites only cases from other
jurisdictions.

Those cases, aside from being irrelevant on the law of Utah, are

unpersuasive for one of four reasons:

(1) Several of the cited cases discuss only a
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"substantial factor" test for causation as opposed to plaintiffs distinct instructions on
"increased risk" and "lost chance of survival".3 Since plaintiffs requested instructions 24
and 32 say nothing about a "substantial factor" test, plaintiff is precluded from urging such
an instruction on appeal. See Newsom v. Gold Cross Services, Inc., supra, 116 UA.R. at 36
(plaintiff failed to propose instruction consistent with "lost chance of survival" theory of
causation). (2) Several other cases do discuss causation in terms of "increased risk" or
"lost chance," but only based on expert testimony of a certain percentage chance of
survival with proper care.4 Since plaintiff presented no such evidence in this case, the
requested instructions were not justified. See Ramon v. Fan, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah
1989) (trial court justified in refusing instruction on plaintiffs theory of causation in
medical malpractice action where plaintiff failed to represent legally sufficient evidence in
support of the theory). (3) Other cases discuss evidence of "increased risk" as a threshold
basis for sending the causation issue to the jury, but still impose some variation of the
traditional standard of proof of "reasonable medical probability."5 (4) The remaining
cases have no relevance to the requested jury instructions.
Long established Utah law requires proof of proximate cause to a degree of
"reasonable medical probability"; a showing of mere "increased risk" of injury or "reduced

Z

Gradel v. Inouye, All A.2d 674 (Pa. 1980); Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hosp, 566 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Roberson v. Counsehnan, 235 Kan. 1006, 686 P.2d 149 (1984); Rudeck v. Wright, 709 P.2d 621 (Mont. 1985); Snead v.
United States, 595 F. Supp. 658 (D.D.C. 1984).
^Kaiser Foundation Health Plan v. Sharp, 741 P.2d 714 (Colo. 1987); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp,, 741 P.2d
467 (Okla. 1987); Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative, 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983); Jeanes v. Milner, 428
F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970); Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 45 A.D.2d 177, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974).
5

McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1972); Vassos v. Roussalis, 658 P.2d 1284 (Wyo. 1983);
Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 597, 688 P.2d 605 (1984).
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chance" of recovery is legally insufficient as too speculative. For example, in the leading
case of Edwards v. Clark, 96 Utah 121, 83 P.2d 1021 (1938), the Court upheld a directed
verdict for the defendant physicians on facts similar to those of the present case. The
plaintiffs wife gave birth to a child; the mother seemed fine until about four days later
when she developed a fever and high pulse rate; her doctors examined her periodically
and prescribed certain medication, but did not discover her uterine infection for four more
days; she died two days later of septic toxemia.

83 P.2d at 1023.

Regarding the

deficiency of evidence on causation, the Court stated:
There is nothing arising out of the case that shows anything the
defendants could or should have done that would or could have changed
the unfortunate result. . . .
. . . That there might have been neglect or lack of skill is not
enough. To permit a cause to go to the jury on testimony showing only
possibility, or what might or could have happened, is to permit a jury to
base a verdict upon conjecture, speculation or suspicion. [Id. at 102930.]
See also Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257, 263, 265 (1931) ("[I]t is not enough to
show the injury, together with the expert opinion that it might have occurred from
negligence and many other causes.

Such evidence has no tendency to show that

negligence did cause the injury." Emp. added.)
Following Edwards and Baxter, Utah courts have consistently required a medical
malpractice plaintiff to prove more than that the challenged act or omission "possibly"
caused the injury, or "increased the risk" of injury, or "reduced the chance" of recovery;
rather, the plaintiff must prove that the alleged cause was medically probable. As stated
in Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523, 526 (1957), "expert testimony must be
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produced to show that the injuries alleged were probably caused by the lack of due care
of defendant." Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah 1978), approved expert "opinion
with probable medical certainty as to what caused the injuries." In Dickinson v. Mason,
18 Utah 2d 383, 423 P.2d 663, 665 (1967), the mere "possibility that the finger might have
been saved with [different] treatment" was held insufficient. In Posnien v. Rogers, 533 P.2d
120, 122 (Utah 1975), "[n]either [expert] testified that the prolapse was probably caused
by" the challenged treatment. And in Newsom v. Gold Cross Service, Inc., supra, this Court
approved the jury instruction requiring proof of causation by medical probability, rather
than a mere showing "that the result might have been different, or that there is a
possibility that the result would have been different." 116 U.A.R. at 34. See also Marsh
v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108, 1110 (1959).
The district court's jury instructions accurately stated Utah law regarding the
standard for proof of causation, consistent with the foregoing cases.

Instruction 16

required plaintiff to prove "[t]hat the negligence of LDS Hospital, through its employees,
was a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs."

(R. 510, Add. 12.)

Instruction 16a required that proof of causation be "[b]ased on a degree of reasonable
medical probability." (R. 511, Add. 13.) Instructions 17, 20 and 21a variously restated
those requirements.

(R. 513, 516, 518, Add. 15-16, 18.) And Instruction 21 defined

"proximate cause." (R. 517, Add. 17.) These instructions adequately informed the jury
on plaintiffs theory of the case regarding claimed Hospital liability. {See Complaint, Third
Cause of Action, R. 9-10.) The instructions provided ample authority for the jury to
render a verdict against the Hospital had the jury not believed the Hospital's expert
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witnesses regarding absence of causation. In summary, since the given instructions were
more than adequate, and the requested additional instructions were not supported by
either the evidence or the law, as explained above, the refusal of those instructions does
not constitute reversible error.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURTS JURY INSTRUCTIONS CORRECTLY
REQUIRED PROOF OF CAUSATION BY EXPERT MEDICAL
TESTIMONY.

Plaintiff objects to the giving of jury instructions 16a and 21a regarding the burden
and manner of proving causation. (Br. of App. at 24; for text of instructions 16a and 21a
see Add. 13, 18.) However, as noted above, Rule 51, U.R. Civ. P., requires that a party
objecting to the giving of a jury instruction "must state distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds for his objection." (Add. 26.) Nonspecific objections, such as the
instruction "is not supported by the evidence" or "does not correctly state the law," are
insufficient to apprise the district court of the claimed error. Beehive Medical Electronics,
Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859, 861 (Utah 1983).

Moreover, "[ejxpansion on

nonspecific objections in a motion for a new trial or in a brief on appeal, as plaintiff did
in this case, does not cure the lack of timeliness in making proper objections to the trial
court." Id. See also Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573, 579 (Utah
1985). At trial, plaintiff objected to instruction 16a solely on the grounds that it "was
confusing to the jury" and "is also contrary to law" in that it includes reference to Doctors
Lloyd and Lahey. (Tr. 894-97.) The first ground is not sufficiently specific, and the
second ground is addressed in Point III, below. Plaintiff objected to instruction 21a on the
sole basis that it requires him to prove that the Hospital's negligence proximately caused
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Mrs. George's death. (Tr. 889-91.) Other grounds for the objection raised in plaintiffs
brief are therefore untimely and cannot provide a basis for relief. In any event, none of
the grounds raised has merit.
For example, plaintiff now argues that instructions 16a and 21a were added to
the court's instructions unfairly, after they had been previously rejected in a certain "offrecord conference." (Br. of App. at 25-27.) Plaintiff made the same argument in his
motion for new trial, and the district court emphatically rejected any notion that plaintiff
was surprised or could rely on off-record discussions:
THE COURT: The Court notes on the record that this case, like
countless other cases which are tried by jury in this court, involve a lot,
a significant amount of dialogue between the Court and counsel, regarding
a number of matters, throughout the entire proceedings of the case. The
Court has absolutely no recollection of what was discussed between
counsel regarding a particular set of jury instructions.
The process in this case, as in every other case, is on-going in
refining jury instructions. It is the Court's recollection that the ultimate
set of instructions given to the jury was the product of a number of
conferences between the Court and counsel.
Further, that there were many instructions proffered by both
Plaintiff and Defendant that were discussed, modified, excluded, included,
all of which was a culmination of many, many discussions between the
Court and counsel about jury instructions. And the Court has absolutely
no recollection of what was or was not discussed regarding a particular
instruction.
For that very reason, it was the Court's insistence that at some
point in time during the proceedings counsel make a record regarding
instructions offered and granted or instructions offered and refused by
the Court. That was the policy of the Court in this case. That has been
and will continue to be the policy of the Court in every case it tries.
It is the responsibility of counsel, once the dialogue has concluded.
between the Court and counsel regarding jury instructions, to make a
record of them, indicating on the record what instructions were offered
and accepted and what instructions were offered and refused.
14

The Court declines to accept any reference to what was or was
not proposed and offered or proposed and refused, regarding the
preparation of jury instructions in this matter. [Tr. of Motion for New
Trial, R. 770, pp. 4-5, emp. added.]
The Utah Supreme Court has similarly rejected reliance on unrecorded discussions
regarding jury instructions. In Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988), the plaintiffs
claimed to have objected to jury instructions in chambers, out of the presence of the court
reporter. The Court concluded that because neither the parties nor the trial judge could
recall the details of the conference and the objection could not be verified in the record,
the Court would not consider the challenge to the instructions. Id. at 17. This Court
took the same position in Birch v. Birch, 111 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989), noting the
appellant's burden to preserve a proper record for appeal, and "declining] to consider
any statements not evidenced in the record." Id. at 1117.
Plaintiff next challenges the requirement in instructions 16a and 21a that he prove
the cause of the claimed injury, i.e., Mrs. George's death, and that the cause of death be
established through expert medical testimony. (Br. of App. at 27-29.) Here, plaintiff
argues against long-established legal principles. In a medical malpractice action, like any
other negligence case, the plaintiff must prove that the substandard act or omission
proximately caused the claimed injury. E.g., Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care,
supra, at 271. In a wrongful death action, in which the claimed injury is death, the
plaintiff must, of course, prove that the defendant's negligence caused the death. 22A
Am. Jur. 2d, Death § 48 (1988). No statement by the district court interpreted by plaintiff
to the contrary could alter that basic requirement of proof. See, e.g., EA. Strout Western
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Realty Agency, Inc. v. W.C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 1320, 1323 (Utah 1983) (trial court's
comments cannot be interpreted to relieve counsel of established obligations at trial).
Regarding the manner of proving causation, Utah law is clear that causation, like
the other elements of a medical malpractice cause of action, must be established by expert
medical testimony. As stated in Farrow v. Health Services Corp., 604 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah
1979):
To make his prima facie case, plaintiff must introduce expert testimony
establishing the appropriate standard of care and the causation of
plaintiffs injuries. [Citations omitted.]
This Court applied the same rule in Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care, supra,
affirming summary judgment for the hospital because the plaintiff failed to establish
causation through expert medical testimony:
In the absence of an expert to testify for plaintiff that the quinidine
harmed him, the court correctly concluded that the jury would have no
evidence upon which to base a finding that the quinidine caused any harm
to plaintiff. [740 P.2d at 271-72.]
See also Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 n.17 (1980) (proof of proximate cause
"requires some expert testimony in medical malpractice cases1'); Huggins v. Hicken, supra,
310 P.2d at 526.
Moreover, expert medical testimony on causation requires testimony of a
physician, rather than that of merely a nurse or respiratory therapist, as offered by
plaintiff.

In Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772, 773 (1951), the Utah

Supreme Court stated:
The better-reasoned cases announce a rule of law to the effect that
in those cases which depend upon knowledge of the scientific effect of
medicine, the results of surgery, or whether the attending physician exercised
the ordinary care, skill and knowledge required of doctors in the
16

community which he serves, must ordinarily be established by the testimony
of physicians and surgeons. [Emp. added.]
The Court reaffirmed this requirement in Huggins v. Hicken, supra, holding that the
standard for postoperative care of a gall bladder patient "should be established by the
testimony of physicians and surgeons." 310 P.2d at 525. The reasons for this requirement
are two-fold. First, evaluation and determination of a medical condition and its cause
comprise the essence of "diagnosis," which, undfer Utah law, constitutes the "practice of
medicine," and can be engaged in only by a licensed physician. U.C.A. 58-12-28; Tolman
v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 682, 684 (D. Utah 1986). Second, an expert in one
field of medicine is not qualified to testify on matters uniquely within the knowledge of
experts in a higher, more complex, or more specialized field of medicine. See Burton v.
Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985); Novey v. Kishwaukee Community Health
Services Center, 531 N.E.2d 427 (111. App. 1988). Accordingly, neither a nurse nor a
respiratory therapist is qualified to testify as to the cause of Mrs. George's death. See
Jones v. Wike, 654 F.2d 1129, 1130 (5th Cir. 1981) (registered nurse not qualified as expert
on post operative care of hernia patient).
Finally, plaintiff argues that the causal connection between the Hospital's
negligence and Mrs. George's death is so obvious that no expert testimony on causation
is required. (Br. of App. at 29-38.) Again, plaintiff relies exclusively on cases from other
jurisdictions that are distinguishable on their facts or standards of proof.
Utah law recognizes an exception to the expert testimony rule, permitting liability
to attach in the absence of such testimony only where lay persons could judge from
common knowledge and experience that the injury would not have occurred with proper
17

skill and care. See Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980) (drill bit dropped down
dental patient's throat); Nixdorf v. Hicken, supra, 612 P.2d at 352 (suture needle left inside
surgery patient); Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772 (1951) (medical supplies
left in suture of tonsillectomy patient). However, this is not such a case. Cases dealing
with injuries of uncertain origin require expert testimony. See Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah
262, 139 R2d 216, 220 (1943) (failure to diagnose "general septicemia"); Forrest v. Eason,
123 Utah 610, 261 P.2d 178, 180 (1953) (brain injury related to bacteriemia); Marsh v.
Pemherton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959) (death of foot tissue following triple
arthrodesis).
Plaintiff would have the jury presume causation from the co-existence of Mrs.
George's suffering and the Hospital's negligence. However, "[t]he fact that the plaintiff
was injured does not raise a presumption or authorize an inference that the defendants'
acts or omissions proximately caused the injury.11 Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209
P.2d 566, 569 (1949). Moreover, !,[t]here is nothing unlawful or inconsistent in a jury's
finding that while a defendant is negligent, his negligence did not proximately cause the
plaintiffs injury." Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah
1981). A plaintiff may not "rest his case on the mere facts of his sufferings, and . . . rely
upon the jury's untutored sympathies, without attempting specifically to evidence the
defendant's unskillfulness as the cause of those sufferings." Baxter v. Snow, supra, 2 P.2d
at 265.
In summary, jury instructions 16a and 21a correctly state the law of Utah
regarding proof of causation through expert medical testimony.
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C

THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS TAKEN AS A WHOLE REVEAL NO
PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

Plaintiff argues that jury instructions 16a and 21a, coupled with the refusal of his
proposed instructions 24 and 32, resulted in prejudicial error requiring a new trial. - (Br.
of App. at 38-41.) However, even if there were an error in the jury instructions, it was
harmless. See Rule 61, U.R. Civ. P. (Add. 31); Ramon v. Fair, supra, 770 P.2d at 137.
Judge Brian agreed in denying the motion for a new trial:
The law never contemplated, in all of the annals of recorded case law,
that a given case would be without error. It would be impossible for a
trial to be error free.

The Court has carefully considered all of the assertions and
allegations and factors asserted by Plaintiff, in Plaintiffs motion for a new
trial. The Court is convinced and persuaded that error may well have
been committed by all of the participants in this case. But the Court is
strongly persuaded that any error committed, in the totality of the trial,
was harmless, that the trial was fair, that the case was vigorously
presented, the jury was properly instructed, and that the verdict was a fair
and an appropriate verdict, in light of the facts and the law. [Tr. of
Motion for New Trial, R. 770, pp. 34-35.]
The jury was clearly instructed that no single instruction, sentence or idea,
although stated in varying ways, was to be singled out as more important than the others,
but that the jury was Mto consider all the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in
the light of all the others." (Instruction 5, R. 499, Add. 11.) So considered, the jury
instructions contained no prejudicial error.
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POINT II:

PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM WAS
NOT TIMELY RAISED, AND THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FRAMING THE VERDICT QUESTIONS.

Plaintiff argues that the Special Verdict form caused prejudicial error by
precluding jury consideration of Mrs. George's pre-death injuries. (Br. of App. at 41-44.)
However, plaintiff did not raise this argument at trial. Plaintiffs only objection to the
Special Verdict form at trial was that it included reference to the defendant physicians.
(Tr. 796-99, 894.) Plaintiff first raised this current objection regarding pre-death injuries
in his reply memorandum in support of the motion for new trial. (R. 662.) Therefore,
the matter is not timely raised and may not be considered on this appeal. See Rule 49,
U.R. Civ. P. (Add. 24-25); Cambelt International Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1241
(Utah 1987); Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah
1985).
In any event, plaintiffs current argument has no merit. As stated in EA. Strout
Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. W.C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Utah 1983):
It lies within the broad discretion of the trial court to determine
whether special interrogatories are to be used and, if so, the content
thereof. In the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion, the
court's actions will not be disturbed.
See also Cambelt International Corp., supra. Here, there was no abuse of discretion.
Contrary to plaintiffs argument, question 3B on the Special Verdict form inquired
regarding causation of all the claimed injuries:
Was the negligence of LDS Hospital . . . a proximate cause of the death
of Betty George and the damages claimed by David George and the heirs
of Betty George? [R. 402-03, Add. 2-3, emp. added.]
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The jury had previously been instructed that plaintiff sought "two different types" of
damages, first on behalf of the heirs "for the wrongful death of Betty George," and
second on behalf of the Estate of Betty George "for damages experienced personally by
Betty George prior to her death." (Instruction 39, R. 539, Add. 20.) This instruction
was thoroughly amplified by instructions 37, 38, 40, and 46. (R. 537-38, 540, 547, Add. 1819, 21-22.)

In the context of these extensive instructions, question 3B plainly had

reference to both types of claimed damages. Therefore, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in framing the Special Verdict questions.6
POINT III:

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS MOTION
TO DIRECT THE VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT
PHYSICIANS.

Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in refusing to direct the verdict in
favor of the defendant physicians. (Br. of App. at 44-45.) However, any error in the
ruling should be raised by the "aggrieved parties," the defendant physicians, not by the
plaintiff. See, e.g., Goglia v. Bodner, 156 Ariz. 12, 749 P.2d 921, 927 (App. 1987). Even
if properly raised, the argument has no merit.7
Despite their pretrial settlement, the defendant physicians were properly retained
as nominal parties at trial, pursuant to U.C.A. §§ 78-27-38 through -40, to assist the jury
in fairly determining the proportion of fault and damages attributable to each defendant.

It should be noted that plaintiffs proposed special verdict form cannot be located in the record. Moreover,
question 3B on the form attached as Exhibit 1 to Brief of Appellant refers "to question # 5 above," not question 3A
above," as quoted at page 43 n.l of the Brief. Even if the jury could have made sense of the confusing cross-references,
plaintiffs proposed 3B differs from the court's 3B so slightly as to make no material difference.
Plaintiff improperly interjects his opinion that the amount which the defendant physicians paid in settlement
corresponded to their comparative negligence of 0-20 percent. That amount, while not a matter of record, more nearly
approximated full compensation for the claimed injuries.
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(Add. 32-34.) Without the defendant physicians present and listed on the Special Verdict
form, the Hospital would have been unfairly prejudiced and potentially exposed to full
liability for the other defendants' conduct.

That is, of course, precisely why plaintiff

wanted the Hospital as the sole defendant. In any event, contrary to plaintiffs assertions,
there was sufficient evidence of the physicians' negligence to preclude a directed verdict,
as the district court ruled. (Tr. 787-93.) In denying, as well, the motion to exclude the
physicians from the Special Verdict form, the district court explained:
The Court finds that there is abundant testimony from a number of
witnesses, but specifically from the final witness called, that there was
present early on in the postoperative history of the deceased that infection
existed, and that infection was not properly identified and treated. It is
a factual question for the jury. The Court so rules. [Tr. 799-800.]
As it turned out, the jury found no negligence against the physicians anyway; therefore,
denial of the motion to direct the verdict in their favor would be, at most, harmless error.
Rule 61, U.R. Civ. P. (Add. 31.)
POINT IV:

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN THE AWARD
OF COSTS UNDER RULE 54.

Plaintiffs final argument challenges the district court's award of costs. (Br. of
App. at 46-47.) Rule 54(d)(1) provides that "costs shall be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." (Add. 27.) The Hospital, as prevailing
party, accordingly submitted a Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements in the amount
of $2,291.58. (R. 690.) After considering plaintiff objections, the district court reduced
the cost award to only $641.58, as set forth in the Final Judgment. (R. 711, Add. 7.)
Plaintiffs assertion that the district court awarded the Hospital "the full $2,291.58" is
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simply false, and plaintiff presents no valid basis for disturbing the reduced award of
$641.58.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the district court's Final
Judgment in all respects.
DATED this . g ^ ^ d a y of October, 1989.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN

Brinton R. Burbidge
Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
LDS Hospital
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^ ^ ^ d a y of October, 1989, four true and correct
copies of the BRIEF OF RESPONDENT LDS HOSPITAL were deposited in the United
States mail, postage prepaid to:
Steve Russell
Kathryn P. Collard
COLLARD & RUSSELL
Attorneys at Law
415 Judge Building
#8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Elliot Williams
Attorney at Law
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Tony Eyre
Attorney at Law
City Center Plaza I, Suite 330
175 East 400 South
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID GEORGE, et al.
SPECIAL VERDICT
Plaintiff,
vs.
KIMBALL LLOYD, M.D., MICHAEL
LAHEY, M.D., and INTERMOUNTAIN
HEALTH CARE, dba LDS HOSPITAL

Civil No. C-87-4199
Judge Pat Brian

Defendant.
At the end of each proposition submitted to you, indicate
your finding by placing an "X" in the appropriate line.

If

there is preponderance of the evidence in favor of the
proposition, indicate by finding "yes."

If there is

preponderance of the evidence against the proposition, indicate
by finding "no."

If there is no preponderance of the evidence

either way on the proposition, indicate by answering "no."
We, the jury in this action, find the answers to the
questions propounded to us, as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1
A.

Was Dr. Kimball Lloyd negligent in his care of Betty

George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

x

B.

If you answered "yes" to question No. 3A above, then

and only then answer the following question:

Was the negligence

of Dr. Kimball Lloyd a proximate cause of the death of Betty
George and the damages claimed by David George and the heirs of
Betty George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No
QUESTION NO. 2

A.

Was Dr. Michael Lahey negligent in his care of Betty

George?
ANSWER:B.

Yes

No

If you answered "yes" to question No. 2A above, then

and only then answer the following question:

Was the negligence

of Dr. Michael Lahey a proximate cause of the death of Betty
George and the damages claimed by David George and the heirs of
Betty George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No
QUESTION NO. 3

A.

Was LDS Hospital through its nursing staff and/or

respiratory therapists negligent in their care of Betty George?
ANSWER:
B.

Yes

No

If you answered "yes" to No. 3A above, then answer

the following question:

Was the negligence of LDS Hospital

including the nursing staff and/or the respiratory therapists, a

o

proximate cause of the death of Betty George and the damages claimed by
David George and the heirs of Betty George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

If you answered f,nofl to question 3A or 3B, or if you found no
preponderance of the evidence either way, then answer no further questions.
gjESTTON NO. 4
What is the amount of damages, if any, sustained by David George,
and the heirs of Betty George and the estate of Betty George? Ihis question
should be answered only if you answered "yes" to question No. 3A and 3B.
General Damages
a.

Loss of consortium

$

b.

Pain and suffering of Betty George

$

Special Damages including:
a.

Funeral and Burial expenses

$

b.

Medical expenses

$

c.

Lost inccene, benefits and household services

$

QUESTION NO. 5
Assessing a percentage only to a party or parties found negligent,
considering the negligence to amount to 100 percent, what percentage of
negligence is attributed to:
a.

Dr. Kimball Uqyd

%

b.

Dr. Michael Lahey

%

c.

IDS Hospital, its nurses
and/or respiratory therapists
%
Total

100

%

Dated t h i s f ( 3 a v

of

A/fifeus-fey

. 1988,

V.
JURY FOREPERS
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Thirci Judicial District

MAR

2 1989

Brinton R. Burbidge - A0491
Larry R. White - A3446
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
Attorneys for Defendant
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID GEORGE, individually and
as personal representative of
the Estate of Betty George, and
as personal representative for
the heirs of Betty George,

FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. C-87-4199
KIMBALL LLOYD, M.D., MICHAEL
LAHEY, M.D., and INTERMOUNTAIN
HEALTH CARE, dba LDS HOSPITAL,

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendant.
This matter came on for trial on October 31, 1988,
before the Honorable Pat B. Brian and the juVy impaneled.

After

the close of evidence on November 9, 1988, special
interrogatories concerning the liability, if any, of the
defendants for the claims of the plaintiff were submitted to the
jury in the form of a Special Verdict.

They jury answered the

following questions as set forth below:
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Question No. 1
A.

Was Dr. Kimball Lloyd negligent in his care of

Betty George?.
ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

Question No. 2
A.

Was Dr. Michael Lahey negligent in his care of

Betty George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

Question No. 3
A.

Was LDS Hospital through its nursing staff and/or

respiratory therapists negligent in their care of Betty George?
ANSWER:
B.

Yes

X

No

If you answered "yes" to number 3A above, then

answer the following question: Was the negligence of LDS
Hospital including the nursing staff and/or the respiratory
therapists, a proximate cause of the death of Betty George and
the damages claimed by David George and the heirs of Betty
George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

Based on the verdict of the jury the Court determines
that a judgment of no cause of action should be entered in favor
of Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey and Intermountain Health
Care, dba LDS Hospital and against David George in his
individual and representative capacities.

-2-
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THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

Judgment of no cause of action should be and is

hereby awarded in favor of the defendants, Dr. Kimball Lloyd,
Dr. Michael Lahey and Intermountain Health Care, dba LDS
Hospital, and against David George in his individual and
representative capacity.
2.

That the plaintiff David George, individually and

as personal representative of the estate of Betty George and
heirs of Betty George and heirs of Betty George take nothing by
his complaint.
3.

The defendant, Intermountain Health Care, dba LDS

Hospital, should be and is hereby awarded its costs in this
action in the amount of $.

ialL^

DATED t h i s * e H ± r d a y of F e b r t r a r y ,

1989.

DISTRICT COURT

Pat B. Brian
District Judge

7
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Final Judgment was mailed this
Lu

&.

day of

/

^'X' 1589, by United States Mail, postage prepaid, to

the following:
Stephen Russell, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
415 Judge Building
#8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Elliott J. Williams, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Lloyd
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
J. Anthony Eyre, Esq.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Defendant Lahey
1 City Centre, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 24
If plaintiffs demonstrate that the acts or omissions of LDS
Hospital increased the risk or harm to Betty George, such evidence
furnishes a basis for you to go further and find that the
increased risk was a proximate cause resulting in the death of
Betty George, and the consequent injuries and damage suffered by
her immediate family and Estate.

AUTHORITY:
GRADEL V. INOUYE, 421 A.2d 674, 678 (Pa. 1980); HAMIL V.
BASHLINE, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978).
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 32
In this case plaintiffs have alleged that the acts and
omissions of LDS Hospital by and through its officers, agents and
employees resulted in the failure of Betty George to receive the
medical care necessary to save her life, and ability to continue
living in a normal and productive fashion.

Should you determine

that the negligence of LDS Hospital effectively terminated Betty
George!s chance for a normal life, then you should disregard any
conjecture as to the measure of the chance for a normal life that
was eliminated.
That isf if you find that the negligence of LDS Hospital
destroyed a substantial possibility that Betty George might have
survived

and returned to a healthy, productive

state, then

defendants are liable for whatever injuries and damage was thereby
proximately caused.

AUTHORITY:

HICKS V. U.S., 368 F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1966).

10

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

6

If in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea is
stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and none
should be inferred by you.

For that reason, you are not to single

out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction
as more important than the others, but you are to consider all the
instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all
the others.
The

order

in which the instructions

are

given has no

significance as to their relative importance.

11

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

/*?

The plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence each of the following propositions:
1.

That LDS Hospital, through its employees,

comply with the applicable medical standard of care,

failed to
and that in

so acting or failing to act, LDS Hospital was negligent.
2.

That

the plaintiffs to this action were injured as a

result of that negligence.
3.

That

employees,

the

negligence

of

LDS

Hospital,

through

its

was a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the

plaintiffs.
4.

The nature and extent of the injuries and damage, and

the amount thereof.
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater
weight of the evidence, that is, such evidence as, when weighed
with that opposed to it, is more convincing as to its truth.

12

INSTRUCTION NO.

The plaintiff in this case cannot recover against the
doctors or the hospital unless it is proven, that,
1.

Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS

Hospital's nursing staff or respiratory therapist or all of
them, based on a degree of reasonable medical probability,
failed to exercise that degree of reasonable care and skill in
caring for the plaintiff that was ordinarily possessed and used
by others in the respective profession practicing in 1986 in
Salt Lake City, Utah, or similar communities under similar
circumstances;
2.

Based on a degree of reasonable medical probability

established through expert medical testimony from a duly
qualified medical doctor, that such failure, if any, was the
proximate cause of the death of Betty George; and
3.

That David George personally, and the heirs of Betty

George, and the representative of the estate of Betty George,
was damaged by the negligence, if any, of one of the defendants
or all of them.
If you do not find, by a preponderance of the evidence,
all of the foregoing propositions with regard to either Dr.
Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS Hospital, the party or
parties, as the case may be, against whom any one proposition is
not found cannot be found to have committed medical malpractice
and your verdict must be in favor of that defendant or

13

defendants.

If you find that the evidence is evenly balanced on

any of the above-mentioned issues, then your verdict should be
for the defendant or defendants on whose behalf the evidence is
evenly balanced.

-2-

14

INSTRUCTION NO.

/ ^

In this lawsuit in order for the plaintiff to recover
damages from LDS Hospital he must prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence based on a reasonable degree of medical
probability, the following:
1.

That the defendant, LDS Hospital, was negligent in

not providing to Betty George that level of nursing care
ordinarily exercised in like cases by reputable members of the
nursing profession or medical technicians, as the case may be,
practicing in the same, or in a similar locality in July and
August of 1986.
2.

That such failure was a proximate cause of the death

of Betty George.
3.

That the death of Betty George caused the damages

claimed by David George.

15

Jury Instruction No.
You are instructed that with respect to the plaintiff's claim
that one or more of the defendants committed medical malpractice,
the term "burden of proof" means that the plaintiff has the
responsibility to prove his claim by a preponderance of the
evidence based ona reasonable degree of medical probability.

If

the evidence is evenly balanced as to its convincing force
respecting plaintiff's claim, you must find that her claim has not
been proved.

However, if you find that the evidence preponderates

in the slightest degree in favor of plaintiff's claim, then you
must find that the plaintiff's claim has been proved.

16

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
The proximate cause of an injury is that which, in natural
and continuous sequence produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.

There may be more than one

proximate cause for an injury.

17

INSTRUCTION NO,

*

You are instructed that where the proximate cause of
Betty George's death and therefore the injury or loss claimed by
plaintiff is not established by a preponderance of the evidence
based on reasonable medical probability from testimony of a
medical doctor, but is left to conjecture or speculation and may
be reasonably attributed to causes over which the hospital or
doctor had no control or responsibility, then the plaintiff has
failed to sustain the burden of proof as to proximate
causation.

18

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

J^

Plaintiff David George on behalf of the Estate of Betty George,
and as personal representative of the heirs of Betty George, Gail
Hoover, David George Jr., Cynthia Brown and Traci Lee Huber, is
entitled to recover any and all damages for injuries, past and
future, which were proximately caused by negligence of defendant
LDS Hospital through the acts of its employees including nurses
and respiratory therapists, Dr. Kimball Lloyd or Dr. Michael
Lahey.

19

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

?o

If you find in favor of the plaintiff and .against any
defendant,

it will then be your duty to award the plaintiff such

damages as you find from a preponderence of the evidence will
fairly and adequately compensate them for all the injuries and
damages they have sustained as a proximate result of defendant's
conduct.

20

3*1
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
In this case, plaintiffs seek damages of two different types.
David George, individually, and as the personal representative of
his children, Gail Hoover, David George Jr., Cynthia Brown, and
Traci Lee Huber, seeks damages on their claim for the wrongful
death of Betty George.

Such damages, which are explained further

in these instructions, are specifically allowed by law under
Utah's Wrongful Death Statute.
David George, as personal representative of the Estate of
Betty George, has made a claim for damages
by

Betty

George

prior

to

her

death.

experienced personally
These

damages

are

specifically allowed by law under Utah's Survival Statute, and are
explained further in these instructions.

21

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
David George, as personal representative of the Estate of
Betty George, has made a claim for the injuries and damage
suffered by Betty prior to her death.
In the event that you find that the negligence of any of the
defendants

proximately resulted in injury or damage to Betty

George prior to her death, then you may award the Estate that
amount of damages which would fairly and adequately compensate for
them.
anguish

In so doing, you may consider her pain, suffering, mental
and

emotional

distress

preponderance of the evidence.

to the

extent

proved

by a

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

H({)

If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff, the
heirs of Betty George, or the Estate of Betty George is entitled
to recover damages from the defendants, or any of them, you must
award that amount of damages which will fairly and adequately
compensate them for the injuries and damage sustained.

However,

you are not permitted to add any amount to your verdict for
federal or state income taxes, court costs, attorneys1 fees, or
for the purpose of punishing any defendant.

Rule 48
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Effect of juror's false or erroneous answer on
voir dire in personal injury or death action as
to previous claims or actions for damages by
himself or his family, 38 A.L.R.4th 267.
Propriety of asking prospective female jurors
questions on voir dire not asked of prospective
male jurors, or vice versa, 39 A.L.R.4th 450.
Visual impairment as disqualification, 48
A.L.R.4th 1154.
Professional or business relations between
proposed juror and attorney as ground for challenge for cause, 52 A.L.R.4th 964.
Validity of verdict awarding medical expenses to personal injury plaintiff, but failing

to award damages for pain and suffering, 55
A.L.R.4th 186.
Effect of juror's false or erroneous answer on
voir dire regarding previous claims or actions
against himself or his family, 66 A.L.R.4th
509.
Examination and challenge of federal case
jurors on basis of attitudes toward homosexuality, 85 A.L.R. Fed. 864.
Key Numbers. — Jury «=> 66,72,112,114 to
121, 125, 126, 131(1) to 133, 136, 148, 149;
Trial *» 28,303,307,312,313,316,321,321V 2 ,
324, 325, 339, 340.

Rule 48. Juries of less than eight — Majority verdict.
The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less
than eight or that a verdict or a finding of a stated majority of the jurors shall
be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury.
Compiler's Notes. - • This rule is similar to
Rule 48, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References.
Number of jurors,
§ 78-46-5.

Three-fourths of jurors may find verdict in
civil case, Utah Const, Art. I, Sec 10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
struction as to the number of concurring jurors
required to reach a verdict. Madesen v. Brown,
701 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1985).

ANALYSIS

Effect of Rule 47(q).
Removal of municipal officer.
Effect of Rule 47(q).
Intent of Rule 47(q) is to allow the parties
the opportunity to ensure that the requisite
number of jurors concurred in the verdict; it is
not a vehicle to bring into issue the court's in-

Removal of municipal officer.
Removal of municipal officer does not require unanimous verdict by a jury; a threefourths majority is acceptable. Madesen v.
Brown, 701 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 124
et seq.
C.J.S. — 50 CJ.S. Juries § 123; 89 CJ.S.
Trial § 494.
A.L.R. — Validity of agreement, by stipulation or waiver in state civil case, to accept ver-

diet by number or proportion of jurors less than
that constitutionally permitted, 15 A.L.R.4th
213.
Key Numbers. — Jury «=» 32(2); Trial «=»
32lh.

Rule 49. Special verdicts and interrogatories.
(a) Special verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a special
verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that
event the court may submit to the jury written interrogatories susceptible of
categorical or other brief answer or may submit written forms of the several
special findings which might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other method of submitting the issues and requiring
the written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court shall
give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus
128
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submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon
each issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the
pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of
the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its submission
to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a
finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in
accord with the judgment on the special verdict.
(b) General verdict accompanied by answer to interrogatories. The
court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general
verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of
which is necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or
instruction as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to
the interrogatories and to render a general verdict, and the court shall direct
the jury both to make written answers and to render a general verdict. When
the general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A.
When the answers are consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58A
in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the
court may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict
or may order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each other
and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment
shall not be entered, but the court shall return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or shall order a new trial.
Compilers Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 49, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appeals.

Ambiguous interrogatories or verdicts.
Appeals.
Discretion of court.
Effect of inconsistent answers
Entering judgment in accordance with answers.
Interest.
Objections to questions.
Proximate cause issue.
Role of jury.
—Special verdicts.
Special interrogatories.
k1*^*
Ambiguous interrogatories or verdicts.
When special interrogatories or verdicts are
ambiguous, counsel has an obligation either to
object to the filing of the verdict or to move
that the cause be resubmitted to the jury for
clarification; if a party fails to take appropriate
action before the discharge of the verdict, that
party generally may not later move for a new
trial on the ground that the verdict was defective. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co.,
701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985).

Where plaintiff did not object below, it canraise the failure to give special verdicts or
interrogatories on appeal without showing spec j a j circumstances warranting such a review.
Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239
(Utah 1987)
not

Discretion of court.
The matter of entering judgment in accordance with the answers to special interrogatorj e 9 i s within the discretion of the trial judge.
Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Nelson, 11 Utah 2d 253, 358 P.2d 81 (1960).
Use of a special verdict is left to the discre£ o n of ^ ^ a l c o u r t ' R e i s e r v' L o h n e r ' 6 4 1
^-^d 93 (Utah 1982).
li 1S
within the broad discretion of the trial
court
to determine if special interrogatories
e
2U* to De u s e d ^ d , # s o used, the content
thereof. E.A. Strout W. Realty Agency, Inc. v.
W.C. Foy & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983).
The use of special verdicts or interrogatories
is a matter for the trial court's sound discretion. Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d
1239 (Utah 1987).
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(Utah 1982); Wilderness Bldg. Sys. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); Gagon v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 P.2d 1194 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments fusal to direct verdict against him, 10 A.L.R.3d
§§ 106 to 151; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 463 et 1330.
s^Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action
C
9C
udg
nt8
§ § 5 9 to 6 1 ;
^ affected by opponent's motion for summary
00 £'h~^i , cf*om JSL
8S C
A LI
5 S L 2 J S n o S t , judgment, or * ^ J $ T A ~ £
ftf"*
" *
direction of verdict on opening statement of ^
*«**• 3 6 A ^ * ' 3 d 1 1 1 3 ' o n ^ ,
counsel in civil action, 5 A.L.R.3d 1405.
Key N u m b e r s . - J u d g m e n t s 199; T r i a l s
Propriety and prejudicial effect of counsel's 167 to 181.
argument or comment as to trial judge's re-

Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections.
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably
directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on
the law as set forth in said requests. The court shall inform counsel of its
proposed action upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties
stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or otherwise waive this
requirement. If the instructions are to be given in writing, all objections
thereto must be made before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise,
objections may be made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may assign as error the,
giving orjhe failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In objecting to thTgiving~of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to
which he objects ^nd the grounds foFhis objection. Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of
justice, may review the giving of or failure to give an instruction. Opportunity
shall be given to make objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of
the jury.
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the court has
instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case,
and if the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors that
they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, in the first paragraph, deleted "during
the trial" following "time" in the first sentence,
made a minor punctuation change in the second sentence, and inserted "of" in the next-tolast sentence; and substituted "jurors" for
"jury" in the second sentence in the second
paragraph.

Compiler's Notes. — This section varies
substantially from Rule 51, F.R.C.P., after
which it is patterned.
Cross-References. — Exceptions unnecessarv
> Ru^e 46.
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PART VII.
JUDGMENT.
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as
between or among themselves.
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the
demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs,
148
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file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the
judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3), (4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.
(Amended effective January 1, 1985).
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3)
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the
appellate court and costs in original proceedings before the Supreme Court, were repealed
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. For
present provisions, see Rule 34(d) of the Rules
of the Utah Supreme Court and the Committee
Note thereto, and Rule 34(d) of the Rules of
the Utah Court of Appeals.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 54, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — As to costs on appeals, see Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
Continuances, discretion to require payment
of costs, Rule 40(b).
Judges' retirement fee, taxing as costs,
§ 49-6-301.
State, payment of costs awarded against,
§ 78-27-13.
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, Rule
62(h).
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 21-5-8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Absence of express determination.
Amendment of pleadings.
Appeal as of right.
Certification not determinative.
Costs.
—In general.
—Challenge of award.
—Depositions.
—Discretionary.
—Expenses of preparation for action.
—Failure to object.
—Liability of state.
—Service on adverse party.
—Statutory limits.
—Untimely filing of memorandum.
—When not demanded.
Default judgments.
Effect of partial final judgment.
Final order.
—Claims for relief.
—Complete disposal of claim or party.
Inconsistent oral statements.
Interest on judgment.
Judgment based on impleaded theory.
Judgment in favor of nonparty.

Motion to reconsider.
Pleading in the alternative.
Presumption of finality.
Real party in interest.
Relief not demanded in pleadings.
Specific performance request.
Unpleaded issue tried by consent.
Cited.
Absence of express determination.
In action based on alleged breach of loan
agreement, where trial court improperly dismissed plaintiff-corporation's complaint with
prejudice and granted defendant-bank judgment on its counterclaim and cross-claim, judgment on cross-claim and counterclaim would
be subject, on remand, to revision since all
claims presented had not been adjudicated and
since trial court made no express determination as required by this section. M. & S. Constr.
& Eng'g Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 24 Utah
2d 139, 467 P.2d 410 (1970).
Amendment of pleadings.
The proper application of Rule 15(b) and
Subdivision (c)(1) of this rule, is that amendments should be allowed where a case has actually been tried on a different issue or a differ-
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Court.
—Duty.
Attachment.
Effect.
—Acceptance of full payment.
Owner or attorney.
—Vacation of satisfaction.
Hearing.
Court
—Duty.
Attachment
Court had duty to make order directing partial satisfaction of judgment to extent of money
collected through attachment proceeding.
Blake v. Farrell, 31 Utah 110, 86 P. 805.
Effect
—Acceptance of full payment
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full pay-

ment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfaction and discharge operated to satisfy and discharge everything merged in and adjudicated
by the judgment. Sierra Nev. Mill Co. v. Keith
O'Brien Co., 48 Utah 12, 156 P. 943.
Owner or attorney.
—Vacation of satisfaction.
Hearing.
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated without action and hearing in equity, and the lien
of an attorney against the proceeds of the judgment does not include his personal right to execute against the judgment debtor. Utah C.V.
Fed. Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 979 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584.
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of

judgment against one joint tort-feasor as release of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181.
Key Numbers. — Judgment *=* 891 to 899.

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
173
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(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, F.R.C.F.
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion
for new trial, § 21-2-2.
Harmless error not ground for new trial,
Rule 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Abandonment of motion.
Accident or surprise.
Arbitration awards.
Caption on motion for new trial.
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict.
Correction of record.
Costs.
Decision against law.
Discretion of trial court.
Effect of order granting new trial.
Effect of untimely motion.
Evidence.
—Sufficiency.
Excessive or inadequate damages.
Failure to object to findings of fact.
Filing of affidavits.
Incompetence or negligence of counsel.
Misconduct of jury.
Motion to alter or amend judgment.
Motion to be presented to trial court.
Newly discovered evidence.
New trial on initiative of court.
Particularization of grounds for motion for new
trial.
Procedure for questioning grant of new trial.
Reconsideration of motion for new trial.
Settlement bare appeal.
Summary judgment.

Time for motion.
Toiling time for appeal.
Waiver.
Cited.
Abandonment of motion.
Abandonment of motion for new trial must
be intentional, and the facts must indicate this
intention. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d
1043 (Utah 1984).
Accident or surprise.
A ^surprise" at trial which could have been
easily guarded against by utilization of available discovery procedures may not serve as a
ground for a new trial under Subdivison (a)(3).
Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P.2d 339 (Utah
1979).
Failure to interpose a timely objection to testimony challenged on the ground of surprise
would be a sufficient reason to deny a motion
for a new trial on that ground. Choumos v.
D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982).
Plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial on
the basis of surprise concerning testimony of
the defendant's expert witness where the
plaintiff failed to object to the testimony either
before, or immediately after, it was given.
Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977).
Claim of error based on accident or surprise,
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record. Bowen v. Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d
602 (1952).
Where the affidavit for publication of summons presented no evidentiary facts, a default
judgment entered against the defendant can be
attacked collaterally. Bowen v. Olson, 122
Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 (1952).
Unauthorized appearance.
Wife who had been personally served with
process but had no actual knowledge of action
was not entitled to relief from judgment
against her and her husband on ground that
appearance for her by attorney retained by
husband was without her authority. Plaintiff
would have been entitled to default judgment
against wife, and his position could not be
worsened by unauthorized appearance over
which he had no control. Brimhall v. Mecham,
27 Utah 2d 222, 494 P.2d 525 (1972).
Cited in Goddard v. Bundy, 121 Utah 299,
241 P.2d 462 (1952); Board of Educ. v. Cox, 16
Utah 2d 20, 395 P.2d 55 (1964); Parker v.

Rolfson, 525 P.2d 612 (Utah 1974); Dynapac,
Inc. v. Innovations, Inc., 550 P.2d 191 (Utah
1976); Olsen v. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123
(Utah 1977); Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc.,
589 P.2d 767 (Utah 1978); Peay v. Peay, 607
P.2d 841 (Utah 1980); Miller Pontiac, Inc. v.
Osborne, 622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981); Kohler v.
Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981); St.
Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982);
Kanzee v. Kanzee, 668 P.2d 495 (Utah 1983);
Pease v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d 613
(Utah 1984); Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700
(Utah 1985); In re Estate of Chasel, 725 P.2d
1345 (Utah 1986); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92
(Utah 1986); Myers v. Garff, 655 F. Supp. 1021
(D. Utah 1987); Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053
(Utah 1987); Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d
1318 (Utah 1987); Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d
1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Blodgett v. Zions
First Natl Bank, 752 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 101 Utah
Adv. Rep. 48 (1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§§ 200, 671 et seq.
C.J.S. —49 CJ.S. Judgments §§ 228 et seq.,
237.
A.L.R, — Incompetence of counsel as ground
for relief from state court civil judgment, 64
A.L.R.4th 323.
Relief from judicial error bv motion under
F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(1), 1 A.L*R. Fed. 771.
Propriety of conditions imposed in granting
relief from judgment under Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), 3 A.L.R. Fed. 956.
Construction of Rule 60(a) of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure authorizing correction of
clerical mistakes and judgments, orders or
other parts of the records and errors therein
arising from oversight or omission, 13 A.L.R.
Fed. 794.
Construction and application of Rule 60(b)(5)

of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizing
relief from final judgment where its prospective application is inequitable, 14 A.L.R. Fed.
309.
Independent actions to obtain relief from
judgment, order, or proceeding under Rule
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
53 A.L.R. Fed. 558.
Lack of jurisdiction, or jurisdictional error,
as rendering federal district court judgment
"void" for purposes of relief under Rule 60(b)(4)
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 A.L.R.
Fed. 831.
Effect of filing of notice of appeal on motion
to vacate judgment under Rule 60(b) of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 A.L.R. Fed. 148.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 294 et seq.,
306, 307.

Rule 61. Harmless error.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 61, F.R.C.P.
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78-27-38. Comparative negligence.
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by that
person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose
faujt exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to
that defendant.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-38, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 2.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 2 repeals former § 78-27-38, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 2, relating to
special verdicts, and reenacts the above section.

Cross-References. — Product Liability Act,
manufacturer or seller not liable if alteration
or modification of product after sale is substantial contributing cause of injury, § »78-15-5.
Skiers not to make claim against or recover
from ski area operator for injury resulting from
any inherent risk of skiing, § 78-27-53.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Assumption of risk.
Bailment.
Causation.
Jury instructions.
Last clear chance.
Unit method of determining negligence.
Cited.
Assumption of risk.
"Assumption of risk," i.e., risk of a known
danger voluntarily assumed, may amount to a
lack of due care constituting negligence; where
such is the case and the party assuming the
risk is the plaintiff in an action governed by
comparative negligence statute, he is chargeable with contributory negligence and is liable
to have his recovery reduced or denied in accordance with its provisions. Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah
1977).
Assumption of risk language is not appropriate to describe the various concepts previously
dealt with under that terminology but is to be
treated, in its secondary sense, as contributory
negligence; when the issue is raised attention
should be focused on whether a reasonably prudent man in the exercise of due care would
have incurred the risk, despite his knowledge
of it, and if so, whether he would have conducted himself in the manner in which the person seeking to recover acted in light of all the
surrounding circumstances, including the appreciated risk; then, if the unreasonableness of
the person seeking to recover is viewed to be
less than that of the person from whom recovery is sought, any damages allowed should be
diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.

Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Structo-Lite Eng'g,
Inc., 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980).
As used in § 78-27-37, "assumption of risk"
is a voluntary and unreasonable exposure to a
known danger. Moore v. Burton Lumber &
Hdwe. Co., 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 1981).
Bailment.
The comparative negligence statutes do not
change the rule that the negligence of a bailee
in handling the bailed property is not imputed
to the bailor. Otto v. Leany, 635 P.2d 410
(Utah 1981).
Causation.
Trial court committed prejudicial error in
submitting to jury question of plaintiffs comparative negligence where his act of alleged
negligence did not in any way contribute to his
injury, although it may have increased severity of damages; comparative negligence becomes a defense for defendant where plaintiffs
negligent conduct was a contributing factor in
causing injury. Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692
P.2d 728 (Utah 1984).
Jury instructions.
If requested, a trial court must inform the
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning
to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence it
finds in a comparative negligence case, if the
effect of such an instruction will not be to con-
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fuse or mislead the jury. Dixon v. Stewart, 658
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).
Last clear chance.
With the adoption of the Comparative Negligence Act, the doctrine of last clear chance as a
distinct tort doctrine was extinguished along
with contributory negligence; however, argument to the jury as to whether a party may or
may not have had the last clear chance to avoid
injury is not precluded, and as bearing on
which party was guilty of the greater negligence, last clear chance becomes just one of
many factors to be weighed in the comparison.
Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).

78-27-39

Unit method of determining negligence.
In a medical malpractice case, the "Wisconsin" method of determining comparative negligence, whereby each defendant's negligence is
compared against the plaintiffs, was rejected
in favor of the "unit" method whereby the negligence of all the defendants is taken together
in making the comparison. Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903
(Utah 1984).
Cited in Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530
(Utah 1979).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note, A Primer on
Damages Under the Utah Wrongful Death and
Survival Statutes, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 519.
Comment, McGinn v. Utah Power & Light
Co. — Jury Blindfolding in Comparative Negligence Cases, 1975 Utah L. Rev. 569.
Some Thoughts on the Use of Comparisons
in Products Liability Cases, 1981 Utah L. Rev.
3.
A New Perspective — Has Utah Entered the
Twentieth Century in Tort Law?, 1981 Utah L.
Rev. 495, 496.
Mulherin v. Ingersoil: Utah Adopts Comparative Principles in Strict Products Liability
Cases, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 461.
Brigham Young Law Review. — The
Merger of Comparative Fault Principles with
Strict Liability in Utah: Mulherin v. IngersollRand Co., 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 964, 966.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 57 Am. Jur. 2d § 426 et seq.
C.J.S. — 65A CJ.S. Negligence § 169 et
seq.

A.L.R. — Comparative negligence rule
where misconduct of three or more persons is
involved, 8 A.L.R.3d 722.
Retrospective application of state statute
substituting rule of comparative negligence for
that of contributory negligence, 37 A.L.R.3d
1438.
Indemnity or contribution between joint tortfeasors on basis of relative fault, 53 A.L.R.3d
184.
Modern development of comparative negligence doctrine having applicability to negligence actions generally, 78 A.L.R 3d 339
Application of comparative negligence doctrine, generally, 86 A.L.R.3d 1206
Comparative negligence doctnne applied to
actions based on strict liability in tort, 9
A.L.R.4th 633.
Effect of adoption of comparative negligence
rules on assumption of risk and contributory
negligence, 16 A.L.R.4th 700.
Key Numbers. — Negligence «=» 97 et seq.

78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages and
proportion of fault.
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury,
if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each
person seeking recovery and to each defendant.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-39, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 3 repeals former § 78-27-39, as en-

acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 3, relating to
contribution among joint tortfeasors, and reenacts the above section.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jury instructions.
If requested, a trial court must inform the
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning
to the plaintiff 50% or more of the negligence it

finds in a comparative negligence case, if the
effect of such an instruction will not be to confuse or mislead the jury. Dixon v. Stewart, 658
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).

78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault
— No contribution.
Subject to § 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant may be
liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the
damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that
defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other person.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-40, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 4.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 4 repeals former § 78-27-40, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 4, relating to

settlement by a joint tortfeasor, and reenacts
the above section.
Cross-References. — Enforcement of contribution and reimbursement, Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 69(h).
Joint obligations, § 15-4-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Indemnity contract.
Plaintiffs minor child as joint tortfeasor.
Workmen's compensation
Indemnity contract.
The former comparative negligence provisions did not invalidate an employer's indemnity contract with a third party whereby employer agreed to indemnify the third party
against claims arising out of injuries to the employer's employees Shell Oil Co v. Bnnkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187 (Utah
1983).
Plaintiffs minor child as joint tortfeasor.
Where plaintiff was awarded a judgment in
action against a defendant to recover the property loss sustained as the result of a collision
between automobiles operated by defendant

and the minor unemancipated daughter of the
plaintiff, and where the daughter's negligence
contributed to the property loss sustained by
her father, the minor daughter was a joint tortfeasor and liable to the defendant for contribution Bishop v. Nielsen, 632 P.2d 864 (Utah
1981).
Workmen's compensation.
Employer cannot be a joint tortfeasor as to
an injury to his employee covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Curtis v. Harmon
Elec, Inc., 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976); Phillips
v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 1980).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah Allows Contribution Against Cotortfeasor De-

spite Immunity from Direct Suit: Bishop v.
Nielsen, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 429.
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